

# TRANSCRIPT

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20th ANNIVERSARY BROADCAST

"CAPITOL CLOAKROOM"

on the

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3:10 - 4:00 PM, EST

GUESTS: Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.)

Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen (R., Ill.)

Representative Carl Albert (D., Ohio.)

Representative Gerald Ford (R., Mich.)

Interviewed by CBS News National Correspondent Eric Seward

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billion dollars each. Can you manage deficits of that kind?

Well I'm not quite sure how you're going to do it without some real danger. And so to reduce those deficits, either there has to be a sharp reduction in spending or there has to be a tax bill or both. And I think the Congress is presently looking at a package bill, so to speak, that will call for a ceiling on expenditures, a ceiling on new obligational authority, and then of course a tax bill and a reduction in net expenditures, as distinguished from appropriations.

And that is a real challenge today. And particularly so, since Britain has devalued the pound sterling and we are now off gold and there's a fair assumption that what gold we've got left will probably be distributed in payment of our commitments abroad. Because if they demand gold instead of dollars, we have no choice except to pay it in that fashion. And that means our little gold hoard will vanish sooner or later.

And that puts us squarely in front of the gun. And it's got to be met in the interests of the preservation of the stability and the credit of the country. Because when you get to the point where you can't pay your bills, what you're actually saying to the world is, "We repudiate our obligations."

And then watch and see what happens to your markets, your prices and everything else. Then you've got to come with the most extreme measures like controls across the board that are anathema in a free country anytime.

SEWARD: Gentlemen, everybody is reassessing on Vietnam, as best they can, including a number of new candidates for President. In all the criticisms of the present line of the war

SEVAREID: I'm sorry, go ahead.

ALBERT: Yes, sir. I think that I am willing to leave the strategy of the war to the generals and to the President who are - who is the Commander in Chief.

I have read General de Gaulle's proposal. I'm not impressed with it personally. As a matter of fact, I'm very unimpressed with nearly everything he does. I don't understand the man. I think when they elected him President, they moved the sphinx from the Nile to the Seine.

(laughter)

He acts to me like some man who's descended from a long line of maiden aunts.

(laughter)

And as far as I'm concerned, unless he comes up with something better than I have read about him, I'm not willing to take his recommendations.

I agree that the Senator has named a list of people whose views ought to be considered. I hope they are being considered and have been considered. I believe they have been. I may be wrong. I'm not privy to the private meetings of the State Department or the Defense Department. I don't want to be.

SEVAREID: Mr. Albert, you feel the strategy ought to be left to the generals. We're now changing our principal general in Vietnam. General Westmoreland is going to come back soon. Do you take this, Senator Dirksen, as a conclusion here in the Administration that a new strategy is necessary?

DIRKSEN: Not necessarily. It must not be forgotten that Westmoreland has been out there for more than four years. That's a longer duty tour - active duty tour - than is ever assigned to a commanding general. And he must be tired and tired in mind. And should come back. Because you've got other capable generals who can carry on and probably carry out the same type of strategy.

But looking at that whole picture, you just examine some alternatives. Do we retreat? If we do, then you've got to ask the other questions that naturally follow.

What about our prestige? And secondly, what about the uninhibited march of Communism? Because it'll have to move through Vietnam and then into Malaya and then into Indonesia. And ultimately encompass all of Southeast Asia.

I think we're poor geography students, because if we paid more attention to it, we would discover that from the closest tip of Indonesia to the Phillipine Islands is only ten miles by water. And already, this so-called Hux, which is the communist outfit in the Phillipines, are becoming active all over again. They'd thought they'd put an end to end it. But it begins now.

And I don't think that you can divide or separate what is going on in Vietnam from the overriding fact that this embraces also the communist march.

So we can retreat and put our prestige on the line and become paper tigers in the eyes of all Southeast Asia.

Secondly, we can embrace the so-called General Gavin idea of setting up some enclaves. If we do, I think our troops would become the sitting ducks.

So those are two that I sort of rule out.

The third is, of course, to give up bombing and see whether that, for a sustained period, will have any effect in bringing them to the negotiation table. There is the danger, however, to our troops who are out there.

When the word went out long ago, when we were engaged in Korea, that we had settled for the 38th Parallel, we had a brilliant drive going at the time. And that drive began to blunt right at that point, as this rumor became common news. And later on turned out to be something more than a rumor. But the net result was that we added 90,000 to the casualty list and expanded that war by a period of two years before we got through.

Those are the dangers. And I think Congressman Albert puts his finger on it when he says, sitting here 12,000 miles away, it's difficult indeed to plot strategy and tactics and tell precisely what to do under a given circumstance. And the generals out there and people on the ground can probably better evaluate all the conditions and all the factors than we can back here.

SEVAREID: Senator Mansfield, isn't there a way - can't we do some big, simple, dramatic thing to finally answer this question of Hanoi's readiness to negotiate? We are sitting off, 10,000 miles from one another, parsing one another's sentences on these various peace proposals. Isn't it possible to do something like sending the Secretary of State, perhaps with the Secretary General of the United Nations with him and perhaps someone like yourself with him, to Rangoon and to Delhi and in sight of the world and ask them to come.